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A corporation is, on a smaller scale (in some instances on a larger
scale), like the political state, in that beneath the cloak of its unity
there is a continuous, at times active but more frequently passive,
struggle for power among the various groups in interest. Some of
these groups, such as the public that deals with it or the employees
who work for it, have as yet achieved only the the barest minimum of
legal right to control its destinies.' In the arena of the law, the
traditional conflict is between the stockholders2 and the creditors.
There is an increasing convergence of interest between these two
groups as the former become more and more "investors" rather than
entrepreneurs, and the latter less and less inclined, or able, to stand
on the letter of their bond'3 both are in the last analysis dependent
*This article is the substance of one of the chapters of the author's forthcoming
book THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CORPORATE CONTROL.
tMember of the New York bar.
'See Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, (1932) 45 HARv. L.
REV. 1145; Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees, 45 H~Av. L. REv.
1365 (1932); O'LEARY, CORPORATE ENTERPRISE IN MODERN EcoNoMIc LIFE
(1933) Chap. V. In April 1933, New York Railways Corporation and Fifth
Avenue Coach Company, in order to increase their "good-will" elected to their
Boards "Public Directors". It has been suggested that the effect upon labor
should be considered a factor in determining between immediate liquidation and
continued operation by receivership, DOUGLAS AND WEIR, EQurry REcEIVER-
SHIPS, (1930) 4 CONN. B. J. 1, 8-9. This is by analogy to the continued operation
of utilities for the public's benefit. See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Cleveland,
252 Fed. 530, 533 (C. C. A. 4th, I9z8). But "a devotion to public use does not
mean devotion to public consumption or destruction", Birmingham Trust & Say.
Co. v. Atlanta, B. &. A. Ry. Co., 271 Fed. 731, 738 (N. D. Ga. 1921). Cf. BANK-
RUPTCY ACT, 47 Stats. x474, zi U. S. C.A. §205 (o), (p), (q) (1933). In the final
analysis the public at large does of course control through the instrumentality of
the political state.
'These may also be divided into hostile groups. See the following articles by
the writer: Protective Committees, (1932) 80 U. PA. L. REv. 670; Suits in Equity by
Minority Stockholders as a Means of Corporate Control, (1933) 81 U. PA. L. REv.
692; Corporate Voting: Majority Control, (i933) 7 ST. JOHN'S LAw REV. 218.
'Ths has reference primarily to the holders of long-term evidences of in-
debtedness. See, BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) 120, 278 et seq.; Isaacs, Business Security and Legal Security
(1923) 37 HARV. L. REv. 201. Cf. Berl, The Vanishing Distinction between
Creditors and Stockholders (1928) 76 U. PA. L. REv. 8r4, where any tendency
to "permit investors to be treated as creditors for the purposes of security and as
stockholders for purposes of profit" is decriel.
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upon the success of the corporation as a going concern.4 Even in
reorganization, when creditors are legally entitled to dominate,'
this economic factor cannot be gainsaid.6
CREDITOR RIGHTS
In this section we shall examine the legal rights,7 if any there be, of
creditors' to control the management of the debtor corporation while
it continues a solvent, going concern.s
This limitation largely excludes from our purview the two subjects
which have been the chief topics discussed in the law of corporate-
creditors: the "trust fund" doctrine9 and the right of creditors to
enforce stockholders' liability.10  The first is excluded because it
properly becomes applicable only when a corporation is insolvent'
4The idea is not new. Almost forty years ago it was said (Greene, The Commer-
cial Basis for Railway Receiverships (1894)33 AMER. LAW REG. & REV. 417,425);
"Railway mortgages are not sacred because of the strong legal terms in which
they are drawn, but are dependent upon success in the business of transporta-
tion... " 5infra.
6"The letter of the railroad mortgage bond has come to be nothing more than
mere legal verbiage, but if the property covered by the mortgage has earned its
charges, the mortgage is allowed to remain and the bondholders are not asked to
make sacrifices. If, on the other hand, the property behind the mortgage has
failed to earn its charges the bondholders are forced to accept a lessening, perhaps
a total extinction of their rights to demand a fixed income. They may object, but
they are powerless to resist, except by acquiring the actual property itself at
foreclosure sale; and the failure of their property to earn its charges prior to the
receivership gives little promise that its earnings would be better after the bond-
holders themselves have exercised the letter of their legal rights... " DEWING,
THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 996-997.
7A factual control is of course exercised by the need to keep available sources of
new credit.
"Limited to the holders of unmatured obligations. The holders of past due
obligations have well-defined legal rights. See GLENN, THE RIGHTS AND REME-
DIES OF CREDITORS RESPECTING THEIR DEBTOR'S PROPERTY (1915). The exer-
cise of these rights tends to force liquidation, a subject outside the scope of this
article.
8aIn seeking the "principles" we may be forced to use dicta in cases which arose
after the corporation had become insolvent.
9We shall of course be unable to avoid the underlying notion of this doctrine to
the effect that creditors have a prior claim to the assets.
1OIn so far as "fraudulent conveyances" are concerned the rules are essentially
the same as for individuals, 8 THOMPSON, CORPS. (3rd ed. 1927) §6235.
"McDonald v Williams, 174 U. S. 397, 19 Sup Ct. 743 (1899); Sweet v Lang, 14
F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Fear v Bartlett, 8I Md. 435, 32 Atl. 322, (1895)
33 L. R. A. 721. In this connection insolvency means merely the inability to pay
debts in the ordinary course of the business, Joseph v Raff, 82 App. Div. 47, 8I
N. Y. Supp. 546 (ist Dept. 1903), affid 176 N. Y. 611, 68 N. E. i8 (1903).
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and probably is not even applicable to an insolvent corporation which
continues as a going concern.12 The second is excluded because the
right may be exercised only after a judgment has been obtained13 and
the property of the corporation exhausted.14
Generally, an unsecured creditor has no claim on his debtor's
property in the absence of a judgment; the debt itself conferring no
title to or equity in his property.' This rule is applicable to corpo-
rate as well as to individual debtors.
1 6
The sweeping dictum that creditors "have no right of control over
corporate management and no interest in or to the assets of a solvent
corporation' 7 is only partially true. It is true to the extent that
creditors ordinarily have no voting rights'8 and hence have no right
to participate in the election of directors or to contest the validity of
corporate elections.' 9 Nor may creditors attack an ultra vires
transaction "unless it also resulted in depleting the assets of the
corporation in fraud of creditors". 20
128THoMpsoN, CORPS. (3d ed. 1927) §§613o, 6131, 6139. Under certain
circumstances the doctrine is applied when the corporation has ceased to do
business by reason of a sale of all its assets even though not insolvent. See Hurd
v. N. Y. & C. Steam Laundry Co., 167 N. Y. 89,6o N. E. 327 (19o).
13Fourth Natl. Bank v. Franklyn, 120 U. S. 747, 7 Sup. Ct. 757 (1887); Cut-
right v. Stanford, 81 Ill. 240 (1876); Handy v. Draper, 89 N. Y. 334 (1882). Cf.
Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U. S. 230, 12 Sup. Ct. 495 (19o); Walton v. Coe, io
N. Y. 109, 17 N. E. 676 (1888); Parker v. Adams, 38 Misc. 325,77 N. Y. Supp. 861
(1902). Performance of this condition precedent may be dispensed with when
impossible of performance. See review of authorities in United Glass Co. v. Vary,
152 N.Y. 121, 46 N. E. 312 (1897).
14Strelaw v. American Color Co., 162 Mich. 709, 127 N. W. 716 (191o); Wether-
bee v. Baker, 35 N. J. Eq. 501 (1882); Appeal of Means, 85 Pa. 75 (1877). Under
special circumstances this requirement may be dispensed with, Shellington v.
Howland, 53 N. Y. 371 (1873). 15GLENN, supra note 8 at pp. 2-6.
16Graham Button Co. v. Spillmann, 5o N. J. Eq. 120,24 Atl. 571 (1892).
1"Sweet v. Lang, supra note ii, at p. 766.
'sUnder certain statutes bondholders may not be given voting rights. See
Durkee v. People, 155 Ill. 354, 40 N. E. 626 (1895); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
167 App. Div. 669, 152 N. Y. Supp. 8o3 (Ist Dept. 1915). See also, Holt v.
California Development Co., 161 Fed. 3 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o8). Cf. Statev. McDaniel,
22 Ohio 354 (1872); Ecker v. Kentucky Ref. Co., 144 Ky. 264, 138 S.W. 264
(1911). 192THoMPsoN, CORPS. (3rd ed. 1927) § 1033.
21Brent v. Simpson, 238 Fed. 285, 291 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916), cerl. den. 243 U. S.
639, 37 Sup. Ct. 743 (1917); Force v. Age-Herald Co., 136 Ala. 271, 33 So. 866
(19o2). Cf. In re Hool Realty Co., 2 F. (2d) 334 (C. Q. A. 7th, 1924), cert. den.
266 U. S. 633, 45 Sup. Ct. 225 (1924); Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber
Co., 19 Wash. 165, 52 Pac. io67 (1898). There is a conflict of authority as to
whether creditors may question the validity of corporate acts by directors and
officers without requisite stockholders' consent. See Royal Indemnity Co. v.
American Bond & Mortgage Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 551, (1933); Leffert v. Jackman,
227 N. Y. 310, 125 N. E. 446 (1919).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The foregoing factors together with the fact that "at common law
no individual liability was imposed upon the members or stock-
holders of a corporation" 21 made the growth of safeguards for the
protection of corporate creditors inevitable. To have left them
completely to the mercy of the stockholders would have been intoler-
able.
The primary source of creditors' rights are certain statutory
provisions now well-nigh universal." In general, these have three
major objectives: (i) to require that stock be issued only for adequate
consideration; 23 (2) to maintain the stated capital by limiting the
declaration of dividends2 and by prohibiting the reduction of capital
to an extent which would render the corporation insolvent;25 and (3)
to make certain financial information available by requiring the filing
of periodic reports in a public office.
2 6
It is from these statutes that most cases take their "policy".27 In
addition, of course, creditors frequently bargain for and receive cer-
nHoffman v. Worden Co., 2 F. Supp. 353, 354 (N. D. Cal. 1933); Warren,
Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 509, 518-522.
=Limitations of space prevent reference to all the statutes and analysis of their
differences. We shall therefore cite only the proposed Uniform Business Cor-
porations Act, approved by the American Bar Association in 1928 (53 A.B.A.
Rep. 92). We shall also take the liberty of treating expressions of courts under
specific. statutes as expressions of general principles. Due to the substantial
uniformity in the American statutory schemes no serious error should result. For
a study of the Massachusetts statutes, see Warren, supra note 21, at pp. 523-544.
2
3 UNiF. Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 15, 16, requiring payment "with cash, other prop-
erty, tangible or intangible, or with necessary services actually rendered". See
DODD, STOCK WATERING (1930).
UNIF. BUS. CORP. ACT §§24, 25, prohibiting payment of dividends "except
from the surplus of its assets over the aggregate of its liabilities" including its
capital.
2UNIF. Bus. CoRP. ACT §41, requiring that any proposed reduction shall "not
reduce the fair value of the assets of the corporation to an amount less than the
total amount of its debts and liabilities plus the amount of its capital stock as so
reduced". Some jurisdictions expressly prohibit the purchase by a corporation
of its own shares except out of surplus. See N. Y. CoNs. LAWS C. 40 (PENAL LAW)
§664.
21UNIw. Bus. CORP. ACT §§I8, 36, requiring report upon organization as to
consideration received for shares and annual reports "as to its financial condi-
tion". The requirement of §I8 that a report be filed as to the consideration re-
ceived for its stock is far from universal, but see [Federal] SECURTIS ACT or
1933, Schedule A (May 27, 1933, c. 38, 48 Stats.).
"Because they are deem*aed to express a "public policy", acts in violation of them
are more than mere ultra vires acts. See West Penn Chem. & fg. Co. v Prentice,
236 Fed. 891, 895 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1916). Prof. Warren is of the opinion that courts
should not attempt to establish safeguards for corporate creditors but should
leave the matter to legislation, supra note 21 at p. 547. "If it be said that in the
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tain special rights by contract.2 These creditor rights, statutory and
contractual, are interpreted by the courts in the light of the relation-
ship which they deem exists between the corporation (that is, its
stockholders as represented by the management, the directors) and
its creditors. The concept of what that relationship should be also
gives rise to certain rights and obligations exclusive of statute and
contract.
Directors of a solvent corporation are not "trustees ' ' 29 for its
creditors; 0 the relation between them "is that of contract aid not of
trust"."1 On this premise it is held that directors are not liable to
creditors for negligence 32 or for mismanagement." The underlying
field of business some of the realities of yesterday are the illusions of today; that
the troublous times through which we are passing demonstrate the need for
greater protection of creditors of corporations, that is a problem of financial and
economic policy which is peculiarly within the province of the legislature. The
legislative machinery possesses greater flexibility than the judicial process can or
should have in such matters", Shientag, J. in Quintal v Adler, 146 Misc. 3oo,
262 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1933).
28This field is as wide as all contract law-we shall advert only to a few typical
cases.
21The word "trustee" has come to be used in corporate matters not in its strict
technical sense but to describe a somewhat ambiguous fiduciary.
20Bird v. Magowan, 43 Atl. 278 (N. J. 1898); Landis v. Sea Isle City Hotel
Co., 31 Atl. 755 (N. J. 1895); Force v. Age-Herald Co., supra note 20; O'Conner
M. & M. Co. v. Coosa F. Co., 95 Ala. 614, 10 So. 290 (1891). Contra: Delano v.
Case, 121 Ill. 247,12 N. E. 676 (1887); Thomas v. Sweet, 37 Kan. 183, 14 Pac. 545
(1889); Hibernia Bank v. Succession of Caucienne, i40 La. 969, 74 So. 267, L.R.A.
1917D 402; Pender v. Speight, 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912). In Sawyer v.
Hoag, 17 Wall. 6Io (U. S. 1873), Mr. Justice Miller said, at 623: ". . . when the
interest of the public, or of strangers dealing with this corporation is to be affected
by any transaction between the stockholders who own the corporation and the
corporation itself, such transaction should be subject to a rigid scrutiny, and if
found to be infected with anything unfair to such third person, calculated to
injure him or designed intentionally and inequitably to screen the stockholder
from loss at the expense of the general creditor, it should be disregarded or an-
nulled so far as it may inequitably affect him".
"Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 147, II Sup. Ct. 924 (1891). Directors do
become"trustees" for the creditors on insolvency or liquidation. See Giles D. M.
Co. v. Kiauder-Weldon D. M. C., 233 N. Y. 470, 476, 135 N. E. 854 (1922);
Olney v. Conanicut Land Co., i6R. 1.597, i8Atl. 18i, (1889) 5 L.R.A. 361; Darcy
v. Bklyn & N. Y. Ferry Co., 196 N. Y. 99, 89 N. E. 461 (1909).
32Deaderick v. Bank, ioo Tenn. 457,45 S. W. 786 (1897); Allen v. Cochran, i6o
La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Savings Bank, 154
Iowa 588, 134 N. W. 857, (1912) 45 L. R. A. (N. s.) 42I. Cf. Ellett v. Newland,
17x La. 1O19,I32 So. 76r (i93r). A trustee in bankruptcy has the right to sue for
negligence and if he refuses creditors may do so, Rural Credit Subscribers' Assn.
v. Jett, 205 Ky. 604, 266 S. W. 24o (1924).
13Natl. Exchange Bank v. Peters, 44 Fed. r3 (E. D. Va. i8go) appeal dismissed
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thought is that creditors have a recognizable grievance only when the
directors "fraudulently" divert assets of the corporation with a
resulting destruction or lessening of the security behind their debt.M
The most frequent methods of diversion of corporate assets away
from creditors are. 4a (i) the payment of unlawful dividends; (2) the
improper reduction of capital; and (3) the purchase by the corpora-
tion of its own stock out of capital.
Much has already been written on the subject of unlawful dividends
and it must suffice here merely to note that it was the obligation
not to pay out dividends improperly that gave rise to the notion
that the capital of a corporation constituted a "trust fund" for the
benefit of its creditors36 and that the limitations upon dividend pay-
ments may not be circumvented by the use of subterfuge.37
Small v. Sullivan is interesting.38  The complaint in an action
brought by bondholders against directors, after the mortgage which
secured the bonds had been foreclosed and th6 corporation liqui-
in 14 4 U. S. 570, 25 Sup. Ct. 767 (r892); Lyman v. Bonney, ii8 Mass. 222 (1875);
Wilson v. Stevens, 129 Ala. 630, 29 So. 678 (19oo); Frost Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 76
Iowa 535 (1889). Contra: Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N. C. 378, 9o S. E. 414 (x916).
A trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to the right of the corpoPation to sue for mis-
management, McEwen v. Kelly, 14o Ga. 720,79 S. E. 777 (1913).
nThis principle may be quite sufficient if it includes the recognition of the right
to preventive relief to prevent such diversion as well as compensatory relief after
the event. Although negligence and incompetence do result in endangering the
security, it must be remembered that "fraud" is not defined and that the courts
could in a "hard" case describe "gross" negligence or mismanagement as "fraud
in law". Furthermore, the first victims of loss caused by negligence or mis-
management on the part of the directors (if they are honest) are the stockholders
and they are in a position to correct the situation.
34aThe payment of excessive salaries of course also reacts to the detriment of
creditors. In proper cases they may be recovered by legal representatives of
the corporation and its creditors in the event of insolvency, see, Ellis v. Ward,
137 Ill. 509, 25 N. E. 530 (189o); McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 205 N.
W. 583 (1925). But probably not, if made without fraud at a time when the
corporation was solvent, see, Buell v. Lanski, 232 II. App. 500 (1924).
33Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law (1928), 28 COL. L. REv.
1046, (1929) 29 COL. L. Rzv. 461, (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 330, 954; Krauss,
Maintenance of a Corporation's Capital (1931) 9 TENN. L. RaV. 215; (Note)
Statutory Responsibility of Directors for Payment of Dividends out of Capital,
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 870; (Note) Actions against Stockholders to Recover Illegal
Dividends, (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 481.
36Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 3o8, 3o Fed. Cas. No. 17944 (C. C. Me. 1824).
37Small v. Sullivan, 245 N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261 (1927); Penn. Iron Works Co.
v. Mackenzie, 19o Mass. 61, 76 N. E. 228 (i9o6).
3 8Supra note 37. It is to be noted that subsequent statutory changes would
have, if then in force, allowed a direct achievement of the result sought to be
obtained, see dissenting opinion of Lehman, J., at p. 36o.
CREDITOR CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS
dated in bankruptcy, to recover for the defendants' fraudulent conver-
sion of assets to their own use, was sustained. The complaint alleged
that the defendants consolidated the debtor corporation, having net
assets of $52,ooo,ooo but an impaired capital position, with another
corporation having assets of only $550 for the sole purpose of recapita-
lizing on a new basis which would make $2,ooo,ooo available as sur-
plus for distribution as dividends to themselves as stockholders, and
that this purpose had been fully carried out. The statutory provisions
for consolidation were fully complied with but the court held that
this did not constitute a defense. 39
There is a dearth of cases wherein creditors attack formal capital
reductions, and this may indicate either that the statutes drawn for
their protection40 have proven effective,4' or that capital reductions
are not frequently resorted to as a means of injuring creditors. There
may be no distribution of "capital" among stockholders except by
way of capital reduction2 and there can be no capital reduction
except pursuant to some express statutory authorization therefor.
43
However, a mere purchase by a corporation of its own stock does not
constitute a reduction of capital" and therefore most of the litigation
in this field has involved stock purchases which ordinarily require no
formal public action.41 Stock purchases may be made only out of
"The mortgage had stipulated that the bondholders had "no recourse" against
the directors but the court held that this afforded no defense to a claim based on
their subsequent fraud.
40Supra note 25.
41See Dominquez Land Co. v. Daugherty, i96 Cal. 453, 468,238 Pac. 697, 703
(1925) sustaining constitutionality of legislation vesting in a Corporations
Commissioner the power to permit a distribution to stockholders of a surplus
created by a capital reduction. See also State ex rel. Radio Corp. v. Benson, 128
Atl. 107 (Del. 1924) for the distinction between a statutory reduction in the
number of shares and a reduction of capital.
4Stevens v. Olus Mfg. Co., 72 Misc. 508, 13o N. Y. Supp. 22 (I9II), af'd.i 46
App. Div. 951 (N. Y. 191I) (memo.). A creditor may proceed directly against
a stockholder who has improperly received a part of the corporate assets (Trotter
v. Lisman, 2o9 N. Y. 174, 102 N. E. 575 (1913)) for the full amount thereof
regardless of existing equities as between the stockholders, Bartlett v. Drew, 57
N. Y. 587 (1874); Clapp v. Peterson, 104 Ill. 26 (1882).
43Sutherland v. Olcott, 95 N. Y. 93 (1884); Seignouret v. Home Ins. Co., 24
Fed. 332 (E. D. La. 1885). On the general subject of reductions of capital stock,
see (1926) 44 A.L.R. xi.
44I-n re Atlantic Printing Co., 6o F. (2d) 553 (D. Mass. 1932). Shares of stock
are not retired by mere purchase, 5 THomPsoN, CORPS. (3rd Ed. 1927) §4084.
46See Wormser, The Power of a Corporation to Acquire Its Own Stock (1915) 24
YALE L. J. 177; Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock (1930) I5 MINN.
L. REv. i.
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"surplus" 4 and therefore neither notes nor agreements for purchase,
even though made when the corporation did have a sufficient surplus,
can be enforced when the necessary surplus no longer exists.
47
The methods of diversion of assets which we have just touched
upon are by and large contrary to express statutory prohibitions, but
they obviously do not exhaust the possibilities, nor is a statute
essential to impose liability upon those guilty of an improper diver-
sion of assets. Thus, it has been held that directors are liable for the
sale to one of their number of property for less than its full value, the
court stating that the doctrine which it applied does not depend on
statute "but rather on principles inherent in the nature of corpora-
tions as artificial persons whose creditors can only enforce their debts
by a resort to the property the corporation has acquired". 48
Short term creditors, or those in a position promptly to mature the
obligation and enforce its payment by the usual methods, are less
dependent upon equitable relief4s than the long term creditor tied to
a corporation for many years. 49 He can hardly be satisfied with a
46Hazard v. Wight, 201 N. Y. 399, 94 N. E. 855 (i91i); Topken, Loring &
Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 2o6, 163 N. E. 735 (1928), noted in (i929) 15
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY I08; Hoover Steel Ball Co. v. Schaefer Ball Bearings
Co., 90 N. J. Eq. 164, io6 Atl. 471 (i919); Hamor v. Taylor Rice Eng. Co., 84
Fed. 392 (C. C. Del. 1897); West Penn Chem. & Mfg. Co. v. Prentice, supra note
27.
' 71n re Atlantic Printing Co., supra note 44; Keith v. Kilmer, 261 Fed. 733
(C. C. A. 1st, i919), cert. den. 252 U. S. 578, 40 Sup. Ct. 344 (1919). In re
O'Gara & Maguire, Inc., 259 Fed. 935 (D. N. J. 199); Grasselli Chem.
Co. v. Aetna Explosives CO., 258 Fed. 66 (S. D. N. Y. i918); In re Fechheimer
Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 19x4), cert. den. 234 U. S. 760, 34 Sup. Ct.
777 (i9x4); In re Tichenor-Grand Co., 203 Fed. 72o (S. D. N. Y. 1913); Clark v.
E. C. Clark Mach. Co., 151 Mich. 416, 115 N. W. 416 (19o8). Cf. Keith v.
Kilmer, 272 Fed. 643 (C. C. A. 1st, 1921); Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262, 169
N. E. 378 (1929); First Trust Co., v. Illinois Central RR. Co., 256 Fed. 830 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1919). As to rights of creditors upon subsequent insolvency where the
transaction was consummated while solvent, see Kaminsky v. Phinizy, 54 F. (2d)
I6 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Clapp v. Peterson, 104 Ill. 26 (1882); In re Brockway
Mfg. Co., 89 Me. 121, 35 Atl. 1612 (1896); Lebens v. Nelson, I48 Minn. 240, 181
N. W. 35o (1921); Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 112 N. J. Eq. 34, 163 Atl. i4O
(1932), noted (I933) i8 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 589; Tait v. Pigott, 32 Wash.
344, 73 Pac. 364 (z9o3); Marvin v. Anderson, I II Wis. 387, 87 N. W. 226 (igoi).
'8Wilkinson v. Bauerle, 4 N. J. Eq. 635, 644 (1886). See also Darcy v. Bklyn
& N: Y. Ferry Co., supra note 31. As to rights of a subsequent creditor, see
Graham v. LaCrosse & M. R. R. Co., 102 U. S. 148 (I88O).
48 Assuming that they are in possession of current data as to the affairs of the
corporation, otherwise the assertion of their legal rights is generally "too late".
4 9The specific creditor may of course sever the relationship by selling the evi-
dence of indebtedness-if there exists a market therefor. From 1913 to 1932 the
total indebtedness of industrial corporations increased 75% but their long-term
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position entirely divorced of any power to prevent incompetent
or improvident dissipation of the corporate assets. He is obliged to
rely upon the intervention of equity or seek to bolster his legal
position by private contract.5 0 Necessarily, a very few typical
illustrations must suffice. A bill by a mortgage bondholder to
prevent the impairment of the mortgaged property by the improper
sale of the property or of more bonds secured by the same mortgage
has been sustained,5' but it may be that directors who operate mort-
gaged property in violation of the terms of the mortgage and depre-
ciate its value are accountable only to the corporation and not to
the bondholders.52
In Hoyt v. DuPont de Nemours Co.,3 the corporation was enjoined,
at the suit of a bondholder secured by a "charge" on all its assets,
from using certain debentures received for its assets even though such
use would have left the bondholder with twice as much security as he
had before. Where the mortgage provides for a sinking fund the
mortgagee may obtain an accounting in the event of non-com-
pliance," and a controlling stockholder has been held liable for the
corporation's failure to maintain a sinking fund as agreed, the stock-
holderhaving profited by theuse of thefunds.55 Extraordinary circum-
stances may induce a court to deprive a bondholder of clear contract
rights. In New Jersey National Bank v. Lincoln Mortgage and Title
Guaranty Company,s' bonds had been issued under a trust indenture
debt increased, 15o% THE INTERNAL DEBTS OF THE UNITED STATES (ed. CLARK,
1933) 175.
50Frequently representatives of the security house that floats a bond issue are
elected to the board to represent the bondholders. See O'LE.Ry, supra note 1,
at pp. 41-44. See Green v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., I18 Misc. 1, 192 N.Y.
Supp. 232 (1922), a.'d. 2o6 App. Div. 647, (4th Dept. 1923) for a case involving
conflicting interests between a minority bondholder and a majority bondholder
who, as majority stockholder, also controlled the debtor corporation.
51Whitmore v. International F. & S. Co., 214 Mass. 525, IO2 N. E. 59 (1913).
It was alleged that the corporation was insolvent and in default, but the court
said "the bill is maintainable whether the principal be due or not, or whether the
coupons be paid or unpaid".
62Young v. Haviland, 215 Mass. 120, 1O2 N. E. 338 (I913); Hart v. Hanson, 14
N. D. 570, 105 N. W. 942 (19O5). 588 N. J. Eq. 196, 1O2 Atl. 666 (1917).
"New York Trust Co. v. Michigan Traction Co., 193 Fed. 175 (W. D. Mich.
1912). The court recognized the right of a mortgagee to invoke the aid of equity
to preserve the mortgaged property. We are not treating in this article the rights
of secured creditors beyond the limited extent necessary briefly to indicate some
types of control which a creditor may achieve by special contract.
"Penn. Canal Co. v. Brown, 235 Fed. 669 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1916), cert. den. 242
U. S. 646, 37 Ct. 240 (1916). The court recognized the right of a bondholder to
insist that the debtor corporation receive a fair price upon a sale of its property.
fsaO5 N. J. Eq. 557, 148 Atl. 713 (1930).
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under which there were pledged real estate mortgages as collateral. The
indenture contained express and precise provisions calculated to main-
tain the collateral at all times at a fixed value and free of defaulted
mortgages. Due to the financial depression and the resultant defaults
in the mortgages, the debtor corporation was unable to comply, and
the court authorized the trustee under the indenture to join in an agree-
ment substantially modifying the indenture.-b The decision is not
without precedent"' but the earlier decisions indicate a greater re-
luctance on the part of courts to interfere with contract provisionsssd
Not being vested with any active affirmative right of control, a
creditor may, when completely pessimistic as to the possibilities of
the current management, prefer that the corporate affairs be turned
over to the control of a court and to that end seek the appointment of
a receiver. The corporation may be insolvent and the object liquida-
tion."6 But with that we are not here concerned.5 7
OPERATING RECEIVERSHIPS5
The general rule is that in the absence of statute, an unsecured,
non-judgment creditor may not obtain the appointment of a re-
51bThe petition was opposed by only one small bondholder.
55cSee Baltimore City v. United Rys. Co., IO8 Md. 64, 69 Atl. 436 (19o8);
Leviness v. Consolidated Gas Co., 114 Md. 559, 80 Atl. 304 (1911); Detroit v.
Detroit United Ry., 226 Mich. 354, 197 N. W. 697 (1924); Price v. Long, 87 N. J.
Eq. 578, ioi Atl. 195 (1917); New York State Rys. v. Security Trust Co., 135
Misc. 456, 238 N. Y. Supp. 354, af'd. 228 App. Div. 750, 238 N. Y. Supp. 887
(4th Dept. 1930).
z5dSee Duncan v. Mobile & 0. R. CO., 2 Woods 542, Fed. Cas. No. 4137 (S. D.
Ala. 1876); Fidelity Ins. T. & S. D. Co. v. United N. J. R. R. & C. Co., 36 N. J. Eq.
405 (1883); Clarkv. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R. Co., 58 How. Pr. 21 (N. Y. 1879);
Watt v. Railroad Co., i Brewster 418 (Pa. 1867): As to necessary parties, see
also, Colorado & So. Ry. Co. v. Blair, 214 N. Y. 497, io8 N. E. 840 (1915).
56See 2 CLARK, RECEIVERS (2d Ed. 1929) §706.
57Our attempt at segregation is largely unrealistic and therefore unsuccessful.
Litigation generally arises when the corporation is in financial difficulties. But
we adhere in the thought that it may be possible, as it is important, to develop a
set of preventive rights and powers. In the two concluding sections (on receiver-
ships and reorganizations) our primary concern is with the not too insolvent
corporation, i. e., one with hope but little life.
5 8There are a number of interesting procedural questions involved in federal
receivership suits which we shall not treat. Among the more important are:
Venue and the need for ancillary proceedings: JuDIcIAL CODE, §56, 36 Stats. 11o2
(I9II),28 U.S. C. §117 (1926);LionBonding Co.v. Karatz,262 U.S. 77,43 Sup.
Ct. 480 (1923); Great Western Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, I98 U. S. 561, 25 Sup.
Ct., 770 (1905); Primos Chem. Co. v. Fulton Steel Corp. 255 Fed. 427 (S. D. N. Y.
1918), 254 Fed. 454 (N. D. N. Y. 1918); Gatch, Tenant & Co., v. Mobile & 0. R.
Co., 59 F. (2d) 217 (S. D. Ala. 1932); Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Power of
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ceiver.59 There are exceptions to this rule" but one-the federal
equity consent receivership-has achieved such importance that it
has verily become the "rule" and almost preempts the field.
6
Much learning has been devoted to finding the precise legal source
of this type of receivership in old English Chancery practice,6' but
Recdvers, (1932) 45 HA- v. L. REv. 429. The burden of ancillary proceedings led
a Special Committee on Equity Receiverships of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York to recommend statutory changes, 1927 YEAR BOOK 299 (see
also hearings on H. R. 9999, 10,000, 71st Cong. 2d. Sess. before House Judiciary
Committee, April 1I, 1930). See GENERAL ORDER IN BANKRUPTCY LI, promul-
gated May 15, 1933. Cf. BANKRUPTCY ACT. §77c (Act of March 3, 1933) as to
powers of a "trustee" thereunder. Conflict with other proceedings: Gross v. Irving
Trust Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 605 (1933); Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 48 Sup. Ct.
268 (1928); Matter of Paramount Publix Corp., 64 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933);
Moore v. Scott, 55 F. (2d) 863 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Superior Oil Corp. v. Matlock,
47 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. ioth, 1931); (Note) State Statutes and the Federal
Equity Courts, (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 688. Disaffirmance or adoption of con-
tracts: Samuels v. E. F. Drew & Co. Inc., 292 Fed. 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923);
American Brake S. & F. Co. v. N. Y. Rys. Co., 282 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922),
appeal dismissed in 262 U. S. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. 704 (1923); Menke v. Willcox, 275
Fed. 57 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Clark, et al, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and
Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. i11. Receiver's certificates: Union
Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 117 U. S. 434, 6 Sup. Ct. 809 (1886); Von
Boston v. United Rys., 8 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925), cert. den. 271 U. S. 665,
46 Sup. Ct. 475 (1926); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Tennessee Cent. R. Co., 291 Fed.
462 (M. D. Tenn. 1921); Westinghouse E. & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit
Co. 26o Fed. 550 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); American Brake Shoe & F. Co. v. Pere
Marquette R. CO., 205 Fed. 14 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913), cert. den. 229 U. S. 624, 33
Sup. Ct. 1051 (1913); Thacher, Some Tendencies of Modern Receiverships, (1915)
4 CAI. L. REv. 32; (Note) Labor Problems in the Judicial Operation of Prop-
erties, (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 882.
'9Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454 (1923); Hollins
v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., i5o U. S. 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 127 (1893); Trustees
Systems Co. v. Payne, 65 F. (2d) 1O3 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Home Mtge. Co. v.
Ramsey, 49 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Leev. Riefler & Sons, 43 F. (2d) 364
(M. D. Pa. 1930); Pond v. Framingham & Lowell RR., 130 Mass. 194 (I881);
Adee v. Bigler, 81 N. Y. 349 (188o). This is true even when the corporation is
insolvent. Solvency is not necessarily a sufficient reason for the denial of a
receivership even by a state court. See Adams v. Farmers Natl. Bank, 167 Ky.
5o6, 18o S. W. 807 (1915): "gross" mismanagement. A secured creditor may
obtain a receivership only if the very property mortgaged is jeopardized, Hutson
v. Long Bell Lumber Co., I Fed. Supp. 468 (W. D. Mo. 1932).
60The readiness with which courts have come to appoint receivers has recently
called forth a rebuke by a state appellate court, Tachna v. Pressed Steel Car Co.,
112 N. J. Eq. 411, 164 Atl. 413 (1933).
6 aThe act of March 3, 1933 amending the Bankruptcy Law does not apply to
corporations other than railroads. Supra note I.
61See Kroeger, Jurisdiction of Courts of Eguity to Administer Insolvents' Estates,
(1924) 9 ST. Louis L. Rnv. 87; Glenn, The Basis of the Federal Receivership, (1925)
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
whatever the source it exists today, in many respects sui generis.
Its development was made necessary by"the fact that the bankruptcy
courts, prior to the amendment of March 3, 1933, were not avail-
able to railroads"2 and it was made possible by the diversity clause
of the federal constitution.6'
In 1888, the Supreme Court held6 that an equity court might, as a
matter of discretion in a proper case, on a bill by a judgment-creditor,
appoint a receiver to operate a quasi-public corporation and that the
creditor's failure to have issued execution was immaterial in the
absence of an objection by the corporation. Two years later it
extended the rule by holding that the corporation's objection that the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law which he had not exhausted
must be made seasonably.6
25 COL. L. REV. 434; Dodd, Equity Receiverships as Proceedings in Rem, (1928)
23 ILL. L. REV. 1O5; (Note) The Propriety of Friendly Receiverships in the
Federal Courts, (193o) 43 HARV. L. REv. 1298; Jacobs, Problems in Federal
"Receivership" Jurisdiction, (1932) I MERCER BEASLEY L. REV. 29; (Note)
Consent Receiverships Instituted by Non-judgment Creditor, (1932) 41 YALE L.
J. lO86. The Federal courts do not appoint receivers of individuals under the
same circumstances as justify them in appointing receivers of corporations. See
Zechial v Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 61 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916); Davis v.
Hayden, 238 Fed. 734 (C. C. A. 4th, I916), cert. den. 243 U. S. 636, 37 Sup. Ct.
400, (1917); Maxwell v. McDaniels, 184 Fed. 311 (C. C. A. 4th, igio); Clark,
Simple Contract Creditor Securing Appointment of Receiver, (1927) I UNIV. OF
CINN. L. REV. 388. The Supreme Court has held that the conveyance by an
individual of his property to a corporation for the purpose of procuring its
administration in equity is "fraudulent in law", Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U. S. 348,
53 Sup. Ct. 145, (1932). But a receiver may be appointed of the assets of a
proposed corporation which proves abortive, Garland v. Wilson, 289 Pa. 272, 137
Atl. 266 (1927). I CLARK, RECEIVERS, (2d Ed. 1929) pp. 228-230 is of the
opinion that courts will ultimately appoint receivers for individuals under the
same circumstances as they do for corporations.
aBANxRuPTcy'Acr, 3O Stats. 547, §4 (I898), 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1926). Although it
was the financial distress of the railroads that gave the initial impetus to the
practice, it is not confined to public utilities, United States v. Butterworth-Judson
Corp., 269 U. S. 504, 46 Sup. Ct. 179 (1926); Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492,
46 Sup. Ct. 18o (1926); First Natl. Bank v. Stewart Fruit Co., 17 F. (2d) 621
(N. D. Cal. 1927); Union Trust Co. v. Jones, I6 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
Some of the practices which have grown up in receiverships, such as with regard
to the priority of "six months claims" have not yet been extended beyond public
utilities. I CLARK, RECEIVERS, (2d Ed. 1929) §§ 676-677.
6
"UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ART. III, §2. See Warren, Corporations and
Diversity of Citizenship, (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 66.
USage v. Memphis and Little Rock RR. Co., 125 U. S. 361, 8 Sup. Ct. 887
(1888).
UBrown v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530, IO Sup. Ct. 604 (189o).
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Prior thereto a federal court had appointed equity receivers of the
Wabash on its own bill66 and when the proceedings were thereafter
indirectly before the Supreme Court, it did not condemn the prac-
tice.
67
The first direct ruling on consent receiverships, as we now know
them, was made by the Supreme Court in igo8, when it sustained the
equity receivership of the New York City transit lines.6 8 It held that
the objection that the plaintiff has no judgment may be waived,69
that a creditor's receivership bill presents a justiciable "controversy"
notwithstanding the defendant's admissions of the allegations and
consent to the receivership, and that there is no "collusion" in such
admission, consent, and the agreement of the parties to resort to the
federal court.
70
Its legality confirmed by this decision,7 1 there developed during the
6 See Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 22 Fed. 272 (E. D. Mo.
1884); Atkins v. Wabash,.St. L. & P. Ry. CO., 29 Fed. 16I (N. D. Ill. 1886);
Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. CO., 29 Fed. 618 (E. D. Mo. 1886).
7Quincy, M. & P. RR. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup. Ct. 787 (1892).
It is doubtful whether the Supreme Court would tolerate the practice today. See
Shapiro v. Wilgus, supra note 6I,at p. 356. The practice was however severely
criticized by other courts, State ex rel Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947
(1894) app. dis. 156 U. S. 478, 15 Sup. Ct. 443 (1899); McIlhenny v. Union Trust
Co., 8o Tex. 1, 13 S. W. 655 (I89O), app. dis. I45 U. S. 641, 12 Sup. Ct. 989 (1892).
See also Jones v. Bank of Leadville, IO Colo. 464, 17 Pac. 272 (1887); In re Moss
Cigar Co., 5o La. Anu. 789, 23 So. 544 (1898); Kimball v. Goodburn, 32 Mich.
io (x875); Jones v. Schaff Bros. Co., 187 Mo. App. 597, 174 S. W. 177 (I915);
Chamberlain, New-Fashioned Receiverships, (1896) 1o HARv. L. REV. 139; Cf.
Collins v. Central Bank, i Ga. 435 (1846); Petition of Kittanning Ins. Co., 146
Pa. 102, 23 Atl. 336 (1892).
"8Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. 219 (19o8).
The lower court had noted the existence of "a multitude of precedents", Penn.
Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 157 Fed. 440, 443 (S. D. N. Y. 1907).
69The waiver need not be express. See Finney v. Continental Baking & Milling
Co., I7 F. (2d) 107 (D. C. Ind. 1927) (removal from state court); Walker v. U. S.
Light & Heating Co., 220 Fed. 393 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) (consent in another district).
Not'all state 'courts follow the federal practice. See National Lumberman's
Bank v. Lake Shore Machinery Co., 260 Mich. 440, 245 N. W. 494 (1932) and
note thereon in (I933) 31 MicH. L. REv. Ioo.
70This decision, together with that in Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 2o8 U. S.
36o, 28 Sup. Ct. 406 (19o8), decided the same year holding that the liabilities of a
receivership are not chargeable against the plaintiff, rendered use of the procedure
adopted by the Wabash unnecessary.
nIt left no doubt as to the power of the court, but the propriety of its exercise in
any particular case is necessarily an open question. See Kingsport Press, Inc. v.
Brief English Systems, Inc. 54 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) cert. den., 286 U. S.
545, 52 Sup. Ct. 497 (1931).
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succeeding twenty years a recognized and customary consent equity
receivership practice in the federal courts.7 2
The theoretical justification for equity receivership seems sound
enough even for industrial corporations to whom bankruptcy is
available. "In bankruptcy nearly every case ends merely in liquida-
tion, * * * the underlying thought, the compelling motive of equity
receiverships is to save the business".73
The requisite technique for coming within the permissive language
of the Metropolitan case was rapidly perfected. It involves procuring
a willing non-resident creditor 4 with a claim for more than $3,ooo
to act as plaintiff, the preparation of a bill which sufficiently indicates
that the corporation is unable to meet its debts as they mature76 and
that there would be insufficient assets to meet the claims of creditors
if they were all permitted to obtain judgments and levy executions
7
but that the corporation is "solvent".7 8 The "complete administra-
tion" which the bill seeks is held sufficient compliance with the rule
that a receivership must be incidental to some ultimate relief.79 The
72From January 1, 1917 to December 1, 1923, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York appointed equity receivers for 233 corpora-
tions having nominal assets of over $750,000,000, Equity Receiverships in United
States Courts, an inquiry by F. L. Hopkins (The N. Y. World, 1924).
73Mayer, Federal Equity Receiverships, 6 LEcTuREs ON LEGAL Topics 161, 165,
(1924). See also Benton v. R. G. Peters Salt & Lumber Co., i9o Fed. 262, 265
(W. D. Mich. 1911); Kroeger, supra note 61 at pp. 200-201.
74See Harkin v. Brundage, supra note 58, at p. 5o. A director of the corpora-
tion, if a creditor, may act, Hutchinson v. Phila. & G. S. S. Co., 216 Fed. 795
(I. D. Pa. 1914). But the filing of a bill by a subsidiary corporation, 99% of
-whose capital stock is owned by the defendant, has been condemned and pic-
turesquely described as "incestuous litigation", Municipal Fin. Corp. v. Bankus
Corp., 45 F. (2d) 9o2 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
"Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, supra note 58.
1i. e., "insolvency" in the equity sense.
"7See Luhring Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal Dock Co., 281 Fed. 265, aff'd
287 Fed. 711 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
78i. e., in the bankruptcy sense, BANKRUPTcy ACT, 30 Stats. 544 (1898), I U. S.
C. §1 (15) (1926). See American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., 171 Fed. 54o
af'd. 183 Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 191o). This is important. The appointment of a
receiver, except on the ground of "insolvency", even with the bonsent of the
corporation, is not an "act of bankruptcy" which would leave the way open to
any creditor to file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, Nolte v. Hudson
Navigation Co., 8 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); In re Edward Ellsworth, 173
Fed. 699 (W. D. N. Y. 19o9). Cf. United States v. Butterworth Judson Corp.,
269 U. S. 504, 46 Sup. Ct. 179 (1926); Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492, 502,
46 Sup. Ct. 180 (1926). Sections 74 and 77 of the BANKRUPTcY ACT (added by
amendment of March 3, 1933), 47 Stats. 1467, 1474 (1898), permit the filing of a
petition by a debtor who "is insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they mature".
79Kingsport Press, Inc. v. Brief English Systems, Inc., supra note 71, at p. 5oi;
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preparatory work is done quickly and secretly" and when the bill is
ready for filing there is also ready for simultaneous filing an answer
admitting the allegations of the bill and consenting to, or joining in,
the prayer for a receiver.8' The receiver is then appointed without
notice to any other creditor.
82
Trustees Systems Co. v. Payne, supra note 59. Cf. National Lumberman's Bank
v. Lake Shore Machinery Co., supra note 69.
8OFor a vivid description of the preparations for a receivership and ancillary
proceedings thereunder, see May Hosiery Mills, Inc., v. F. & W. Grand 5-xo-25
Cent Stores, 59 F. (2d) 218 (D. C. Mont. 1932). See also New York Times, June
30, 1933, p. 34. If there is to be a receivership there is of course a legitimate need
for haste and secrecy to prevent one creditor obtaining a preference by judgment
or attachment. Unfortunately, it frequently is merely a race to make sure that
the receivership will be under "friendly" auspices. For an indication of these
"races" see Christian v. R. Hoe & Co., Inc., 63 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933);
Matter of Paramount Publix Corp., supra note 58. From their apparent eager-
ness to make sure that the receivers are appointed in "their" action, it would seem
that attorneys have taken the remark that "there should be no 'friendly' receiver-
ships" (Harkin v. Brundage, supra note 58, at p. 55) as the statement of a hope
rather than a fact. It is said that telegrams have been left unopened by judges
because they knew they contained information that a receiver had already been
appointed by another court and would thus prevent the appointment of another,
testimony of Mr. Blanc before House Judiciary Committee, supra note 58 at p. 2o.
Equity Rule 5 of the Southern District of New York requires the disclosure of all
pending suits.
81At least to this extent the great majority of federal equity receiverships are
prearranged. Standing alone it seems not to constitute illicit "collusion",
Metropolitan Receivership, supra note 68; Kingsport Press, Inc. v. Brief English
Systems, Inc., supra note 71. In Harkin v. Brundage, supra note 58, there also
appeared a conspiracy to oust the state court of jurisdiction and that the plaintiff
was assured that it would not be involved in any expense. In May Hosiery
Mills, Inc. v. F. & W. Grand 5-io-25 Cent Stores, supra note 8o, the court found
that the purpose of the receivership was not to aid the creditors but to aid the
corporation to escape some burdensome leases, infra note 87.
2Equity Rule 8 of the Southern District of New York provides that, except in
the case of a public utility, a meeting of creditors should be held during the first
6o days of operations by the receiver. The receivership works no change in
ownership and the corporate existence and functions continue, Royal Indemnity
Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., supra note 2o; cf. United States v.
Whitridge, 231 U. S. 144,34 Sup. Ct. 24 (1913); Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co.,
286 U. S. 334, 52 Sup. Ct. 512 (1932). The practice of appointing as co-receiver
one of the officers of the defendant has been condemned, May Hosiery Mills, Inc.
v. F. & W. Grand 5-IO-25-Cent Stores, supra note 8o, at p. 220. It must be
noted that despite the refusal of the court in the cited case to appoint any ancillary
receivers and its condemnation of the appointment of one Green, defendant's
executive vice-president, as a co-receiver by the primary court (S. D. N. Y., E66-
133, 1932), he was appointed ancillary co-receiver in 21 other jurisdictions (Re-
ceiver'sReport, No. i, Julyi, 1932). Thepracticeisof course defended on the ground
that one familiar with the business is necessary for its successful operation. In
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Abuses developed8 and brought forth vigorous condemnation by
the Supreme Court calculated to restore equity operating receiver-
ships to the status of the extraordinary instead of the usual.8 The
equity courts themselves are endeavoring to correct some of the
abuses. At least one court has adopted the procedure of appointing
on an ex parte application only a temporary receiver and not making
the appointment "permanent" until notice has been given to all
parties in interest.85 And if any objecting party establishes "the
solvency of the defendant and its ability to meet its obligations
currently accruing" the receivership will be terminated." It has also
deference to this reason, it has been said that even an officer who had been guilty
of mismanagement may be appointed receiver, Fowler v. Jarvis, Conklin Mtge.
Trust Co., 66 Fed. 14 (S. D. N. Y. 1894). DEwING, supra note 6, at p. 952, cites
a study by H. H. Swain, which showed that in 138 out of I5O railway receiver-
ships from 1867 to 1897, old officers of the railroad were appointed as receivers or
co-receivers. See also American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F.
(2d) 886, 89r, aff'd 49 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 193I).
1The most popular outcry has been against the patronage involved and the
allegedly exorbitant allowances to receivers and their counsel. See Hopkins,
supra note 72. A Special Committee on Equity Receiverships of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York found that the costs in equity were higher than
in bankruptcy but that the allowances in bankruptcy were too low, 1927 YEAR
BOOK 299. It is also significant "that a careful review of the reported cases for
the past ten years [1914-8924] discloses three instances only in which any security
holder or creditor has taken exception to the fees or expenses of receivership",
ROSENBERG, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND THE FEDERAL COURT (1924)
xi. The aggregate cost of the large reorganization is very high. Thus the
reorganization of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul cost more than $5,000,000,
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, i31 I. C. C. 673, 699 (1928).
It is also charged that receiverships are permitted to carry on much too long.
"Indeed, such bills have come to afford a species of locus poenitentiae for the
study of possibilities by creditors, shareholders, directors, receivers, and various
self-appointed committees sitting under the chancellor's 'umbrella' and watching
the weather outside", Hough, C. J., in Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey
Mfg. Co., 5 F. (2d) 39, 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). See also Kingsport Press Inc. v.
Brief English Systems, Inc., supra note 71. This criticism somewhat overlooks
the idea that equity receiverships were designed to permit reorganization and to
prevent liquidation. The "weather" outside may be a most important element
in the success of a reorganization. Cf. Equity Rule 8 of the Southern District of
New York.
"Harkin v. Brundage, supra note 58, at p. 55; Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co.,
supra note 82, at p. 345; Shapiro v. Wilgus, supra note 61, at p. 356; Johnson v.
Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U. S. 479, 53 Sup. Ct. 721 (1933). For a consideration
of the effect of these "cautionary admonitions", see Ex Parle Relmar Holding
Co., 6I F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. den. 53 Sup. Ct. 405 (133).
nMunicipal Fin. Corp. v,. Bankus Corp., supra note 74.
86Christian v. R. Hoe & Co. Inc., 63 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). See also
Mitchell v. Lay, 48 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 9th 8930), cert. den. 283 U. S. 864, 51
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been suggested that the purpose of the receivership must be to
benefit creditors and not the defendant corporation.
87
Equity receiverships have also been severely criticised becaise they
have not achieved their avowed purpose-reorganization instead of
liquidation. One investigator reported that a majority of the cases
which he examined resulted in liquidation.88 Another study dis-
closed that out of forty equity receiverships only one resulted in
actual reorganization."9 These statistics undoubtedly give an unfair
picture because the same weight is given to small unimportant units
as to the large and important ones. 0 The undue resort to equitymay
be because of excessive optimism or because of the lure of higher
fees.1 a Recognizing the unwarranted strain imposed upon the
system, determined efforts are being made to induce bankruptcy for
those corporations which are palpably beyond rescue.9'
Whatever the weaknesses or abuses, the equity receivership is a
method devised to achieve the socially desirable object of saving
corporations only temporarily embarrassed, or of enabling those
interested in them to realize their fair going-concern value rather than
only junk value. Accordingly, it is correctly regarded as merely a
procedural step in reorganization.9' It is an open question whether it
Sup. Ct. 656 (193o). Cf. Union Trust Co. v. Jones, supra, note 62; American
Brake S. & F. Co. v. Pere Marquette R. Co., supra note 58. The objection must
be made seasonably, American S_ S. Co. v. Wickwire-Spencer Steel Co., supra
note 82, objector stockholder of defendant.
87May Hosiery. Mills, Inc. v. F. & W. Grand 5-io-25 Cent Stores, supra note
80. However, the receivership roundly condemned in the cited case was deemed
proper in 29 jurisdictions and it proceeded in regular course until transferred to
bankruptcy upon the recommendation of the equity receiver, supra note 81.
The real objection was that the receivership was directed against a single class
of creditors--the lessors. See Douglas and Frank, Landlord's Claims in Reor-
ganizatiOns (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1oo3. For a number of instances where
equity receiverships were had for purposes other than the direct benefit of credit-
ors, see DEWING, supra note 6, at p. 945.
88Hopins, supra note 72.
8"DOUGLAS AND WEIR, supra note I.
"°See CRAvATH, The Reorganization of Corporations, in SomE LEGAL PHASES OF
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917) r54, for an
indication of some of the successes of equity reorganization.
goaSupra note 83.
"1Municipal Fin. Corp. v. Bankus Corp., supra note 74; Matter of Bankus
Corp., 45 F. (2d) 907 (S. D. N. Y. 1930). The equity court is without power to
compel bankruptcy, Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., supra
note 83, but it has been sought to correct this by statute, see Hearings by Housa
Judiciary Committee held April I I, 1930 on H. R. 9997, 71st Cong. 2d. Sess.
92See CRAVATH, supra note go; lecture on Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages by
Byrne in same volume, and Cutcheon, Recent Developments in Federal Railroad
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is the best possible agency to operate embarrassed businesses and
supervise their reorganization; it has its staunch defenders;93 others
prefer the bankruptcy court,94 and still others, new administrative
tribunals." The method apparently most recently in favor with
Congress is a combination of administrative and judicial action.9"
Whatever the auspices under which they may be promulgated, the
basic problems inherent in reorganization will remain.
97
Foreclosure Procedure, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, RE-
ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1931) 79, 80; ROSENBERG, supra note 83, p. 2,
DEWING, supra note 6, p. 944.
93Mayer, supra note 73; Taft, Recent Criticism of the Federal Judiciary, (1895)
18 A. B. A. Rep. 237; ROSENBERG, supra note 83, IX circa.
4Hough, C. J., in Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., supra
note 83, P. 45. For an indication of the difficulties of reorganization in bank-
ruptcy (except, of course, under the Act of March 3, 1933), see Acme Harvester
Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 3o0, 32 Sup. Ct. 96 (I911); In Re Wayne
Realty CO., 275 Fed. 955 (N. D. Ohio 1921); In re Prudential Outfitting Co.,
25o Fed. 504 (S. D. N. Y. ig8); In re J. B. & J. M. Cornell Co., 186 Fed. 859,
(S. D. N. Y. 1911); In re Northampton Portland Cement Co., 185 Fed. 542 (E. D.
Pa. I9II). But see 7 REMINGTON BANKRUPTCY (3rd ed. 1924) §3074.2.
"6See Taft, supra note 93, p. 264; ROSENBERG, supra note 93. This thought
may underly the remark by Mr. Justice Peckham, in the Metropolitan Receiver-
ship case, supra note 68, that "A court is a very unsatisfactory body to administer
the affairs of a railroad as a going concern". Administrative action, on the other
hand, has not escaped criticism when it has been tried, see dissenting opinions of
Commissioner Eastman in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization, 76 1. C. C.
84, io8 (1922); Denver & Rio Grande Western Reorganization, 9o I. C. C. 141,
156 (1924); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization, 99 I. C. C. 330, 332 (1925);
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, 131 I. C. C. 673, 701 (1928).
See also LOcxLIN,REGULATION OF SECURITY ISSUES BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
CoMIssSIoN (1925) Chap. X.
"BANKRUPTCY ACT, §§75, 77 (added March 3, 1933), supra note 78. This is no
easy way out, for "the relation between courts and administrative tribunals con-
tinues to be one of the most baffling problems", Powell, The Relation Between the
Virginia Court of Appeals and the State Corporation Commission, (1933) I9 VA. L.
REV. 433. See, Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations
Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 571, 582 et seg.;
(Note) Supervision of Railroad Reorganization Expenses by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, (1931) 40 YALE L.J. 974, condemning the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of the courts and the Interstate Commerce Commission over railroad
reorganizations.
97 "Lawyers are apt to exaggerate their own importance and the significance of
their legal machinery in determining the form and details of reorganization pro-
cedure, forgetful that a reorganization is primarily an adjustment of human mo-
tives and economic conditions, circumscribed rather than determined by the law",
DEWING, supra note 6, p. 932.
"Mere shift in the repository of power or change in the mechanics of courts goes
for little or nothing", Bourquin, D. J., in May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. F. & W.
Grand 5-1o-25 Cent Stores, Inc., supra note 80, p. 221.
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REORGANIZATION98
The usual object of a reorganization necessitated by financial
embarrassment is to rearrange the financial structure99 without break-
ing up the business unit. To achieve this object, it is manifestly
necessary to take away, in whole or part, from some their strict
"legal" rights for the benefit of others. Primarily, the problem is
economic and not legal. In so far as it is legal, the basic questions
involved relate to the relative priorities to which the different classes
of "old" securities are entitled in the reorganized corporation, and the
respective rights of the minority, or dissenting, holders of a particular
class as against the majority thereof who are in favor of a proposed
reorganization plan.
The first of these questions centers on compliance with the rule of
the Boyd case. 10o It, in substance, is that upon reorganization the
stockholders may not receive any rights or interests in the reorganized
corporation in preference to the creditors,'' and that when, in pur-
9 Probably the best available material on the legal aspects is to be found in the
books cited supra notes 9 o , 92. See also Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on
Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganizations, (1933) i9 VA. L. REV. 541; Rodgers
and Groom, supra note 96. For a non-legal study, by a lawyer, of a large railroad
receivership, see LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933).
"Generally, so as to reduce fixed charges, raise new capital, and fund past due
or early maturities.
'" 0Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 (1913). The
decision might have been predicted on the basis of Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7
Wall. 392 (U. S. x868) and Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, etc. Ry., i74 U. S.
674, 19 Sup. Ct. 827 (1899), but see the contrary lower federal and state court
decisions cited in the Boyd opinion at p. 5o3. The view that the "sale" is a mere
"form" for effecting a transfer to the reorganized corporation was also not new,
see Walker v. Whelen, 4 Phila. 389 (Pa. 1861).
'01The principle may be broader and may mean "that the relative priorities of
the old securities, senior to the most junior securities which continue to have any
interest in the property, must not be inequitably disturbed", Swaine, Reorganiza-
tion of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade (1927) in SoME LEGAL
PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONS (1931)
142 and the same author in CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND THE FEDERAL
COURT, supra note 83, at p. io4. This would not necessarily be so if the Boyd
decision was only an application of the rule against fraudulent conveyances
(GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) 300), although it has
been suggested that the same result could be reached by a court of equity on
some broad notion of "fairness", Frank, supra note 98. See Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 238 Fed. 812 (E. D. Mo. 1916); New York Trust Co. v.
Continental & Comm. Trust & S. Bank, 26 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928),
cert. den. 278 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 8o (1928); In re Howell, 215 Fed. I (C. C. A.
2d, 1914), cert. den. 235 U. S. 703, 35 Sup. Ct. 205 (1914).
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suance of a reorganization plan which provides for the stockholders'02
but not for the creditors, the property is sold to the "new" corpora-
tion, a creditor may follow the assets03  'The Supreme Court, how-
ever, qualified the rule as follows: 104
"This conclusion does not, as claimed, require the impossible
and make it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a
condition of stockholders retaining an interest in the reorganized
company. His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on
equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock. If he de-
clines a fair offer he is left to protect himself asany other creditor
of a judgment debtor, and, having refused to come into a just
reorganization, could not thereafter be heard in a court bf equity
to attack."
Despite the mental distress which the Boyd decision caused
' "There is no moral turpitude, nor is there any illegality in the making and
performing'of an agreement between the bondholders secured by mortgages, the
stockholders, and the unsecured creditors -f an insolvent mortgagor, that there
should be a foreclosure and saleof the-mortgagedproperty to orfor the benefit of a
new corporation in which all the members of thethree classes shall be permitted at
the option of each of them to take the bonds or stock of the new corporation in
substantial proportion to the respective ranks and equities of the classes", St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McElvain, 253 Fed. 123, 133 (E. D. Mo. 1918).
The right of a stock holder to receive securities in the reorganized corporation
arises not out of his status as stockholder but solely under the Plan and he must
therefore receive them pursuant thereto if at all, Dow v. Iowa Central Ry. Co.,
i44 N.Y. 426,39 N.E. 398 (I895). Where he is not a partyto the reorganization
agreement (Bondholders') but only a beneficiary thereunder he has no standing
to sue for its modification but must accept or reject it4n toto, Miller v. Dodge, 28
Misc. 64o, 59 N.,Y. Supp. 1070 (1899). In United Water Works Co. v. -Omaha
Water Co., 164 N. Y. 4, 58 N. E. 58 (i9oo) it was held that under the Plan the
Bondholders' Committee was not authorized to allot common stock in the "new"
corporation to the preferred stockholders of the "old".
103The right exists in favor of all who hold "unsatisfied claims", Pierce v.
United States, 255 U. S. 398,,41 Sup. Ct. 365 (1921) (fine); Safety Car Heating &
Lighting Co. v. U. S. Light & Heating Co., 2 F. (2d) 384 (W. D. N. Y. 1924)
(patent infringement claim); Howard v. Maxwell Motor 'Co., 269 Fed. 292,
affid. 275 Fed. 53 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ,(lease); cf. Kansas City Terminal Ry. 'Co. v.
Central Union Trust Co., 28 F. (2d) 177 (C.C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. den. 278 U. S.
655, 49 Sup. Ct. 179 (1928) (executory contract), but see Okmulgee Window
Glass Co. v. Frink, 260 Fed. I59 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), cert. den. 251 U. S. 563,
40 Sup. Ct. 342 '(1919). Cf. Equitable Trust Co. v. United Box Board & Paper
Co., 22o Fed. 714 (D. C. N. J. 1915). The right may be lost by laches, Waller
v. Texas & Pac. IRy. Co., 245 U. S. 3 9 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 142 (i918); St. Louis & San
Francisco RR Co. v. Spiller, 274 U. S. 3o4, 47 Sup. Ct. 635 (1927). Themeasure
of recovery is considered in Mountain States Power Co. v. A. L. Jordan Lumber
Co., 293 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 9th 5923) cert. den. 264 U. S. 582, 44 Sup. Ct. 217
(1924), but see Mr. Swaine's comments thereon, supra note 1o1, at pp. X74-s75.
104228 U. S. 482, 508.
CREDITOR CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS
reorganization lawyers,"'5 it must be accepted as controlling. The
problem is to make certain, beyond peradventure, that the reorganiza-
tion is "just" and that the terms offered the creditors are "fair" and
"equitable".
What is "just, fair and equitable" is, of course, so completely
dependent upon the details and circumstances of the particular case
that nothing beyond the broadest generalities are available for
guidance."' 6 The following may be ventured:
i) The stockholders may receive securities in the "new" cor-
poration worth more than the amount they are assessed as a
condition of participation. 01 7
2) The securities offered to the creditors need not be superior
in rank or grade to those which the stockholders may obtain;
the priorities may be adjusted in the amount of securities given
to each or in the amount of the assessment imposed on each. 08
3) Where the creditor is offered two or more alternatives, it
is sufficient if only one is fair.'
4) The fairness of the reorganization must be determined
by the Chancellor in the "exercise of an informed discretion
concerning the practical adjustment of the several rights", 110
and he should "avoid artificial scruples" but look for "sub-
stantial justice".'
But how to procure the timely approval of the chancellor so as to
put to rest the specter of the Boyd case?"
2
10See CRAVATH, supra note 90, at p. 197; Cutcheon, AnExaminationof Devices
Employed to Obviate the Embarrassments to Reorganizations created by the Boyd
Case (1927) in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCE REORGANIZATION
AND REGULATION (1931) 35.
'0'See generally, Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority
Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, (1928) 28 COL. L. REv.
127; Swaine, supra note xos, at pp. 148-16o; Buscheck, A Formula For the
Judicial Reorganization of Public Service Corporations (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 964.
'0?Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co., 2o F. (2d) 8o8 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927), cert. den.
275 U. S. 569, 48 Sup. Ct. 141 (1927); P. R. Walsh Tie & Timber Co. v. Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co., 280 Fed. 38 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) cert. den. 260. S. 743, 43 Sup. Ct.
164 (1922).
'0sKansas City Ry. v. Central Union Trust CO., 271 U. S. 445, 455, 46 Sup. Ct.
549 (1926). For the application of the principles in the same case see 28 F. (2d)
177 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 655, 49 Sup. Ct. I79 (1928). See also
Termmer v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
'09Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust CO., 28 F. (2d) 177,
188 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 655, 49 Sup. Ct. 179 (1928).
n0lKansas City Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., supra note io8.
'Kansas City Ry. v. Guardian Trust CO., 240 U. S. 166, 178, 36 Sup. Ct. 334
(igi6). It seems that reorganization plans are "uniformly sanctioned" by the
courts, see Weiner, Reorganization Under Section 77: A comment, (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 834, 846; TRACY, CORPORATE FORECLOSURES (1929) 350.,1"Cutcheon, supra note ioS; Swaine, supra note IOI, pp. 142-148.
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The typical equity receivership of the kind above discussed is
ordinarily promptly consolidated with a foreclosure suit brought by
the first mortgagee (commonly a corporate-trustee under a trust
mortgage securing the mortgage bonds). In due course the mortgagee
procures a judgment of foreclosure and sale and is in position to wipe
out all junior security holders.12a At this stage, economic realities
impinge upon legal theory. The first mortgagee does not want to
foreclose all junior interests because it is from them that the needed
new capital is most readily obtained. Nobody but the bondholders,
because of the right to use the bonds in payment, can reasonably
bid for the property at a foreclosure sale, and hence the sale, instead
of being a means of realizing in cash the fair value of the property
sold, becomes an idle ceremony whereby title is transferred to those
who represent the majority-bondholders.2b
Prior to the Boyd case, the courts adopted the practice1 of insert-
ing in the foreclosure decree an "upset price", that is, the minimum
price at which the court would confirm the sale." 4 Its object was, of
course, to protect the mortgagor from a sale at an inadequate
price. In effect it is a weapon in the hands of the court in a con-
flict between assenting and dissenting mortgage bondholders because
a low upset price means a small cash distribution to the bondholders
who stay out of the reorganization and a high upset price means a
large cash distribution to them with the resultant burden upon the
reorganization. 16
With the enunciation of the doctrine of the Boyd case, "fairness"
achieved by such indirection became clearly insufficient. A direct
judicial determination of "fairness" became essential."6 This re-
nl2aFor a discussion of some procedural problems in connection with sales in
equity under the Federal Judicial Code, see Israels, Reorganization Sales, (1932)
32 COL. L. REv. 668.
lubThe set-up is frequently much more complicated and requires the adjustment
of conflicting claims to the mortgaged property and, in railroad receiverships, the
problem of divisional liens is no simple one.
'11It is discretionary, American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., supra
note 82.
" 4Spring, UpsetPricein Corporate Reorganizations (1919) 32 HAnV. L. REV. 489.
'15Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization
(1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 132. See also Colin, Why Upset Price? An Argumentfor
Reorganization by Decree (1933) 28 ILL. L. REV. 225.
1n5Where there is a foreclosure sale the determination is ordinarily made in
connection with the confirmation of the sale pursuant to provisions inserted in the
foreclosure decree, Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co.,
supra note lo9, at p. I85; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McElvain, 253 Fed.
123 (E. D. Mo. 1918). Swaine, supra note oi, at p. 146, note 34. Sometimes the
determination is made before, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.,
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quired a marked change in the attitude theretofore assumed by
receivership courts as to their "neutrality" with respect to reorganiza-
tion plans,1 1 7 and some modification of technique, but the most diffi-
238 Fed. 812 (E. D. Mo. 1916); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M & St. P. Ry.,
15 F. (2d) 434 (N. D. Ill. 1926); Sullivan v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 147
Misc. 485, 263 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1933). In Industrial & General Trust Ltd. v.
Tod, 18o N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7 (19o8) it was held that under the deposit agree-
ment there considered the committee was impliedly bound to submit a reorganiza-
tion plan before foreclosure sale so that the depositors might avail of the right to
withdraw in time to act. The foreclosure decree is no adjudication of the rights of
the parties to a reorganization agreement inter sese, Fuller v. Venable, I18 Fed.
543 (C. C. A. 4th, 19o2). The sale may, of course, be in equity and without a
mortgage foreclosure, Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable
Co., Inc., 296 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. den. 265 U. S. 587, 44 Sup. Ct. 633,
(1923). The sale may be "private", Stokes v. Williams, 226 Fed. 148 (C. C. A. 3d,
1915), cert. den. 241 U. S. 681, 36 Sup. Ct. 728 (1915). As to whether a sale is
necessary in order to cut off the rights of security holders who do not participate in
the reorganization, see Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. CO., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1922), cert. granted 261 U. S. 61I, 43 Sup. Ct. 363 (1922), dismissed by
stipulation, 262 U.S. 762, 43 Sup. Ct. 701 (1923); Coriell v. Morris White, Inc., 54
F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, I93i), rev'd. sub. nom. National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 53
Sup. Ct. 678 (1933); Harding v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 14 F. (2d) 168
(N. D. Ga. 1926).
117In 1894, Circuit Judge Lacombe required "absolute neutrality" on the part
of a "receiver as between conflicting plans of reorganization", Fowler v. Jarvis-
Conklin Mtge. Co., 63 Fed. 888, 890 (S. D. N. Y.). In 1918, after the Circuit
Court of Appeals had sustained his order in the Aetna Explosives Company
receivership (252 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 2d)), Judge Mayer appointed a reorganiza-
tion committee and upon its failure to agree personally promulgated a plan of
reorganization, ROSENBERG, supra note 83, 62-63. More recently Judge Mack
directed a trustee in bankruptcy to assist in the organization of a bondholders'
committee and to supervise the drafting of the deposit agreement, In re G. L.
Miller & Co. Inc. (S. D. N. Y. 1926). In practice the tie-up is frequently most
close. In the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Reorganization, 99 1. C. C. 330, 336 (1925),
it was noted that "the reorganization managers acted substantially as a board of
directors for the receivers in all matters affecting the management and operation
of the property during the period of the receivership". The notion of judicial
"impartiality" persists, see In re International Match Corp., 59 F. (2d) 1012
(S. D. N. Y. 1932). The foreclosure of very large real-estate mortgage bond
issues has recently presented the state courts with analogous situations and they
seem to have gone even further than the federal courts in their direct attack on
the fairness of reorganization plans, see Clinton Trust Co. v. I42-z44 Joralemon
Street Corp., 237 App. Div. 789,263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dept. 1933); Bergelt v.
Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905, aff'd. 236 App. Div. 777 (Ist Dept.
1932); Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp., 147 Misc. 374, 265 N. Y.
Supp. II5 (1933). See also Carey and Brabner-Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage
Foreclosures: V. Reorganization (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. i. People v. S. W. Straus &
Co. Inc., N. Y. L. J. May 2, 1933, P. 2644. It has however been held that a
separate plenary suit is necessary in order to procure an injunction against the
consummation of a reorganization, Empire Trust Co. v. Bim's Realty Corp.,
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cult problem was to assure the binding effect of the decree. The
matter is still beclouded with uncertainty.
When the property of the corporation is sold to a new corporation
all the old creditors and security holders are effectually barred by the
decree confirming the sale, because, in the absence of a violation of the
Boyd doctrine, they may not follow the assets and the "right" against
the old corporation-left without assets-is valueless."" Recognizing
the empty formality of the sale in a reorganization, courts have
attempted to do without it. The outstanding case is Phipps V.
Chicago, R. I. &t P. Ry. Co."9 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit there held that a court of equity having possession of
property may authorize its transfer to a reorganized corporation and
restrain creditors from pursuing the property except pursuant to the
plan of reorganization thus compelling them to accept securities
under the reorganization plan if the court deems the terms fair. The
decision was defended 120 and criticised.12' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari21 but was unfortunately prevented from passing
on its merits."' In the cited case the Court held the decree binding on
a creditor who filed a claim, but in a related case 24 it also held it
binding upon one who did not.
In a little known and uncited case1 " the Supreme Court held that a
N. Y. L. J., Nov. 23, 1932, p. 2323. In Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon
Street Corp., the court suggested that equity has another indirect weapon of
control in its power to direct the foreclosing trustee to purchase the property for
the benefit of all bondholders. See First National Bank v. Neil, 137 Kans. 436,
20 P. (2d) 528 (*933) and the authorities there cited; Leesman, Corporate Trustee-
ships and Receiverships (933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 238,259-261. See also Chapter 729
of the New York Laws of 1933 granting such power by statute; cf. the Michigan
statute held unconstitutional as to dissenting bondholders in Detroit Trust Co. v.
Stormfeltz Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227 (2932).
"8fAs to the rights of receivership creditors, see Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Bloom, 164 U. S. 636, 17 Sup. Ct. 216 (1897).
119284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). See also American Brake Shoe & Foundry
Co. v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 296 Fed. 204 (W.D. Pa. 1918), where a receivership
was terminated without sale and the court enjoined creditors from prosecuting
their claims for ten months, the corporation being required to comply with certain
conditions in the interim.
1 2 0
R SENBERG, supra note 83, at 224; Colin, supra note I1.
1'See Swaine, supra note 2oi, at 167-172; Harding v. American Sumatra
Tobacco Co., 14 F. (2d) 168 (N. D. Ga. 2926).
M261 U. S. 6II, 43 Sup. Ct. 363 (1923).
'"Dismissed per stipulation, 262 U. S. 762, 43 Sup. Ct. 702 (2923).
124Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln Horse & Mule Comm. Co., 284 Fed.
955 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
-lInternational Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 262 U. S. 346, 43 Sup. Ct. 574 (1923).
Receivership on stockholders' bill based on mismanagement, court approved of a
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receivership court is without jurisdiction to enter such a decree as
against persons not parties to the suit.
The latest ruling on the question is by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit126 which held that creditors may not be re-
quired to accept securities for their claims and are entitled to cash-
ordinarily their proportionate share of the proceeds of a judicial
sale, but that a dissenting creditor is not always entitled to insist upon a
sale and in lieu thereof may be required to accept his proportionate
share in cash based on an appraisal of the property. The Supreme
Court reversed, without passing on these questions, because the lower
court approved the reorganization plan on insufficient evidence. 27
Whether the procedural problems are solved by statute or by
judicial legislation the conflict of interest between those who approve
and those who disapprove a proposed plan of reorganization will
remain.12a It is important that any procedure adopted make ade-
quate provision for the presentment of their respective views to the
tribunal whose decree will bind them.
28  -
There is a very strong feeling that the wishes of the majority
should govern,u9 but there is Teal danger that blind adherence to any
such rule may permit the working of injustice. The individual secur-
reorganization plan and barred "annuity certificate" holders who did not join in
plan within twenty days-from asserting any claim. Held, without jurisdiction as
to non-parties.
lUCoriell v. Morris White, Inc., 54 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
'22National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 53 Sup. Ct. 678 <1933). The court also was
apparently dissatisfied because the value was fixed one year later. The valuation
has a'so been criticised as being merely liquidating value, see Frank, supra note
98, pp. 716-718.
127a6"The inevitable-outcome of it all is compromise. An adjustment is reached
partly on the basis of the constructive power of the majority, and partly through
the weight of obstructive tactics at the hands of the minority", W. Z. RIPLEY,
RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION (1915) 390.
28For a discussion of proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
see HARvEY, RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS (2d Ed. 1929).
U9Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra note 107, atp. 815; Fearonv. Bankers'
Trust Co., 238 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1916); CorporateReorganization-an Amend.-
ment to the Bankruptcy Act-A Symposium (1933) 19 VA. L. REV. 317; (Note)
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 387; Seiff, Corporate Reorganizations: Defects and a Remedy,
(1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 75; Act amending Federal Bankruptcy Act approved
March 3, 1933; DELAWARE GEN. CORP. LAw, LAWS OF DELAWARE 1929, p. 368,
See. 5 (9); KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §77Ia; Gates v. Boston & N.Y. Air Line
RR. Co., 53 Conn. 333, 5 Atl. 695, app. dis. 122 1. S. 646 (1885); Gilfillan v.
Union Canal CO., 109 U. S. 401, 3 Sup. Ct. 304 (1883); Canada So. Ry. Co. v.
Gebbard, 109 U. S. 527,3 Sup. Ct. 363 (1883), Cf. Mather v. Cinn. Ry. Tunnel
Co., 3 Ohio C. Ct. 284 (1888); Landis v. WestPenn Ry. Co., 133 Pa. 579,19Atl.
556 (189o); Keane v. Moffly, 217 Pa. 240, 66 Atl. 319 (1907).
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ity holder is not in a position to pass upon the merits of a proposed
reorganization or effectively to express any views thereon even if he
has any.30 In practice, therefore, the majority vote is simply that of
the "protective" committee, or of the reorganization committee, with
whom a majority of the securities of a particular class have been de-
posited.'' This might be deemed quite sufficient if deposit bespoke
an actual choice and agreement. In truth, the practical and psycho-
logical factors are such that the security holder deposits without much
130An individual security holder will ordinarily not be permitted to intervene
(Penn Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co. i6o Fed. 222 (S. D. N. Y. 19o8)), but a
committee, or even more than one for good reason, will be, Penn Steel Co. v. N. Y.
City Ry. Co., 181 Fed. 285 (S. D. N. Y. 19IO). "In my opinion, the recognition
by the court of any bondholders', stockholders' or creditors' committee in
receivership proceedings should be conditioned upon the submission to the court
of the terms of the deposit agreement and further modification of or approval
by the court, and that such provisions, not merely as to compensation but
also as to creditors' rights of withdrawal, ratification of reorganization plans and
many other matters as the court may deem proper in the circumstances of the
particular case," Circuit Judge Mack, as Arbitrator, in Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. v. Ulster & Delaware Railroad Co., (S. D. N. Y. E. 61-329, April 8,
1932). Intervention is "discretionary", Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry., supra note 116; cf. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218
Fed. 336 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914). Stockholders will not be permitted to intervene in
a foreclosure merely to assert defenses which the receiver can assert, Conley v.
International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 286 (S. D. N. Y. 1915). In a strict fore-
closure, that is, one proceeding without the aid or agreement of the stockholders,
the stockholders have no standing to attack the reorganization, if the value of the
property is less than the liabilities, American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel
Co., supra note 82. Ordinarily bondholders will be permitted to intervene only
when the trustee acting for them also represents conflicting interests or is guilty of
bad faith, Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., supra note 116;
Clinton Trust Co. v. i42-I44 Joralemon Street Corp., supra note 117. In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., it was held that the mere fact that the
trustee was depositary for a committee and one of its officers was secretary of the
committee was not sufficient. Cf. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
218 Fed. 336 (C. C. A.2d, 1914). See also Fidelity Trust Co. v. Washington-Oregon
Corp., 217 Fed. 588 (W. D. Wash. 1914). One need not be a party in order to be
heard, Investment Registry, Ltd. v. Chicago & M. E. Ry. Co., 212 Fed. 594
(C. C. A. 7th, 1913). Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act has been criticised for
according to dissenters too generously the right to be heard, Rodgers and Groom,
supra note 96, at pp. 590-592. Dissenters are, however, given "little real protec-
tion", ibid. at p. 589, see also, Weiner, supra note i i i; Frank, supra note 98, at pp.
7o8-711.
131See generally, Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders'
Reorganizations, (1929) 42 HARV. L. Rxv. 899; (Note) Bondholders' Committees
in Reorganization, (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 377; Rohrlich, Protective Committees,
(1932) 80 U. of PA. L. REv. 670.
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consideration of the merits.1 2 The necessary result is that the court
must be "vigilant to see, on the one hand, that a dissenter be not
permitted to create a maneuvering value in his bonds by opposing
confirmation, and on the other, that the majority does not use its
power * * * to oppress a helpless minority."',
The right of the minority to be treated equally with the ma-
jority'" is not sufficiently assured by an offer of formal equality. The
majority committee may be motivated by private intangible con-
siderations beneficial only to them13 5 and the minority must therefore
be given an opportunity not only to attack any discrimination against
them but also the plan itself. Otherwise the dangers of a pro forma
approval are too great.
A minority committee is generally at a great disadvantage
because it is ordinarily organized to oppose a committee already
in the field which was organized under the sponsorship either of the
mInvestment Registry, Ltd. v. Chicago & M. E. Ry. Co., supra note I3O, at p.
611; Isaacs, supra note 3, at pp. 2o8-9; Commissioner Eastman dissenting in
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, 131 I. C. C. 673, 702-703 (1928);
Industrial Realty Fin. Corp. v. S. W. Straus & Co. Inc., 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 905 (1932). Mr. Frank goes so far as to say that majority approval should
have "no probative value whatever", supra note 98, at p. 714.
inInvestment Registry, Ltd.. v. Chicago & M. E. Ry. Co., supra note 130, at p.
61o; to the same effect, Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747, 754 (C. C. A.
8th,1926), where the court also stated that in weighing the claims of dissenters it
would consider whether they bought the securities "pending the reorganization
and for the purpose of speculating thereon".
13Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533 (1919). Cf.
North Amer. Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 28 F. (2d) 174, 175 (E. D.
Mo. 1926) mod. and afd sub. nora. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central
Union Trust Co., 28 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 655,
49 Sup. Ct. 179 (1928) holding that the fact that the reorganization committee
purchased claims from certain creditors thus giving them better terms was no
objection, but see Investment Registry, Ltd. v. Chicago, & M. E. Ry. Co., supra
note I3O, where the court refused to confirm a sale because the committee had
"chilled" the bidding by purchasing a large block of bonds which might have been
used by a competing bidder.
1lSuch as retaining control of the corporation, or the good will of the investment
bankers who floated certain of the securities. In National Surety Co. v. Coriell,
supra note II6, Mr. Justice Brandeis said, at p. 682:
"The creditors who approved of the plan of reorganization appeared to
be actuated in their recommendations and desires by considerations not
applicable to the dissenting creditors. For the bank creditors, unlike the
others, were to a large extent secured by the pledge of assets and may more-
over, have received preferences which would be held invalid if bankruptcy
proceedings were instituted. The assenting merchandise creditors were
interested not merely as creditors but as sellers of goods; and it appeared
that at least some were far more interested in expected profits from future
sales than in possible dividends on their existing claims."
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corporation or the investment bankers who sold the securities. The
committee is wholly powerless to act if it is in no position to circu-
larize the security holders to solicit their deposits or proxies. It is
essential therefore that the committee have their names and ad-
dresses. In a few recent cases the aid of the court has been sought to
procure such lists.138
Relief has been granted and denied. It would seem that the sound
rule should be that the minority committee may compel disclosure
when the information is in the possession of, or has been procured
from, a person owing fiduciary obligations to all the security holders
of the class, such as the corporation itself,137 the trustee under a mort-
gage indenture, or the investment bankers who floated the issue, but
not when the information is only in the possession of the majority
committee as the result of its own efforts and expense.
13Bergelt v. Roberts, supra note 117; rn re International Match Corp., supra
note 117; Industrial & Realty Fin. Corp. v. S. W. Straus & Co.,Inc., supra note
132. See also Hart v. Wiltsee, ig F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. Ist, 1927), cert. den. 275
U. S. 559, 48 Sup. Ct. 419 (1927).
137By an application of the rule that the relationship between a debtor corpora-
tion and its bondholders is not that of trust (supra, note 3o) such relief
has been denied against the debtor corporation (Marx v. Merchants' National
Properties, Inc., 149 Misc. 6, 265 N. Y. Supp. 163 (1933). It would seem that a
court could, where the corporation is in financial difficulties, find a trust rela-
tionship. (See supra, note 31).
